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Abstract
We consider the generic problem of Secure Aggregation of Dis-
tributed Information (SADI), where several agents acting as a team
have information distributed amongst them, modelled by means of a
publicly known deck of cards distributed amongst the agents, so that
each of them knows only her cards. The agents have to exchange
and aggregate the information about how the cards are distributed
amongst them by means of public announcements over insecure com-
munication channels, intercepted by an adversary “eavesdropper”, in
such a way that the adversary does not learn who holds any of the
cards. We present a combinatorial construction of protocols that pro-
vides a direct solution of a class of SADI problems and develop a tech-
nique of iterated reduction of SADI problems to smaller ones which are
1
eventually solvable directly. We show that our methods provide a so-
lution to a large class of SADI problems, including all SADI problems
with sufficiently large size and sufficiently balanced card distributions.
1 Introduction
We consider a generic scenario where a set of agents Agt have information
distributed amongst them, i.e., included in their collective knowledge, while
each agent has only partial knowledge of it. The agents act as a team that has
to exchange and aggregate that information, either as common knowledge
within their group or in the individual knowledge of at last one of them.
The exchange is performed over insecure communication channels and is
presumed intercepted by an adversary. The task of the team is to achieve the
aggregation of the distributed information, following a prearranged protocol,
in such a way that the adversary does not learn important information.
More specifically, we model the problem by assuming that the information
that each agent has is encoded by a set of “cards” that she1 holds in her
hands, where the cards are drawn from a publicly known deck2 and every
card is in the hands of exactly one agent of the team. The deck of cards
should be seen merely as a metaphor for the information held by each agent,
an idea that has proven useful for modelling secure computations in several
settings unrelated to our own [8, 9, 10]. The goal of the team is to exchange
and disseminate across the whole team the information about how the cards
are distributed among the agents. It is assumed that the agents can only
communicate by making public announcements over insecure channels and
that there is an “eavesdropper” Eaves (E) whose goal is to learn as much
as possible about the distribution of the cards by intercepting and analysing
the announcements exchanged by the agents in Agt. In particular, Eaves
wants to learn who owns at least one of the cards. We further assume that in
their exchange of announcements the agents follow a publicly known (hence,
known by the eavesdropper, too) protocol.
The scenario described above is a variation of the well-known “Russian
1For convenience of exposition, we will assume that the agents are female while the
eavesdropper is male.
2The drawing and distribution of these cards is considered secret and secure and we
will not discuss the side issue of how exactly that is done. In reality, we assume that each
of the agents has obtained her initial information in some private way.
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cards problem”, which is more than one-and-a-half centuries old [6] but has
recently had renewed attention [13], leading to many new solutions (e.g.
[1, 4, 11, 12]). Here we will generalize the problem substantially by allowing
an arbitrary number of agents, but on the other hand we restrict it essentially
by assuming that the eavesdropper has no cards in his hands3. According to
our knowledge, such a multi-agent setup had only previously been considered
in [5], although our approach is very different. Interest in this problem arises
from the fact that it is based on information-theoretic cryptography [7], where
security is not contingent on the computational complexity of breaking the
code but rather on communications that do not contain sufficient information
for an eavesdropper to learn the original message.
Main results and contributions:
In this paper, we introduce the generic Secure Aggregation of Distributed
Information (SADI) problem and model it in the style of the Russian cards
problem. We introduce a formal framework for specifying SADI problems
involving any number of communicating agents and leading to several notions
of security and informativity. We then focus on a version of SADI problems
with natural safety and informativity conditions, for which we present a
combinatorial construction of protocols that provides a direct solution of a
class of SADI problems and then develop a general technique for solving the
problem by reducing it recursively to smaller instances. Finally, we show how
this method can be used to solve a wide class of SADI problems, including
all SADI problems with sufficiently large size and sufficiently balanced card
distribution.
Our results and methods may eventually be used for developing practical
protocols for secure communication, which we briefly suggest in the conclud-
ing section.
3The effect of allocating cards to the eavesdropper is deeper than just the fact that not
all cards are in the hands of the team. It also creates the danger that the announcements
of the agents in the team about cards they do not hold may reveal unwanted information
to the eavesdropper. So, the solution protocols developed here would generally not work
in the case where the eavesdropper holds cards, and we leave that case for future work.
Organization of the paper:
We motivate the current work in Section 2 by presenting a detailed exam-
ple which showcases some of the notions that will arise throughout the text.
Section 3 then provides the general setup of the Secure Aggregation of Dis-
tributed Information (SADI) problem. In Section 4 we focus on solving the
SADI problem in the 3-agent case, and in Section 5 we set the stage for work-
ing with more agents. Section 6 describes a general technique by reduction to
smaller cases, which is then employed in Section 7 to prove that a large class
of instances of the SADI problem are solvable. In a brief concluding section
we suggest further extensions of our techniques and some applications. Then,
we include in an appendix some more technical proofs consisting of algebraic
manipulations.
2 An illustrative example
Before we present the generic setup and embark on a general analysis of
the multi-agent setting, we begin with a non-trivial illustrative example of
the type of problems we consider in the paper. It involves a team of three
agents4, Alice (A), Bob (B) and Cath (C) who hold respectively 2, 3 and 4
cards, identified with the numbers 1, . . . , 9.
We are interested in designing a protocol that would eventually inform
each of the agents about the deal, while the eavesdropper Eaves (E) may not
learn the ownership of any of the cards.
We will describe informally a protocol solving this problem, by describing
it on a (randomly chosen) particular deal in which we assume, without loss
of generality, that Alice gets {1, 2}, Bob gets {3, 4, 5}, and Cath gets the
remaining cards {6, 7, 8, 9}. We will use the notation HA|HB|HC to represent
the deal and may omit set-brackets, so that the deal may also be written as
1, 2 | 3, 4, 5 | 6, 7, 8, 9.
Step 1. Alice chooses at random a card not in her hand, say 9. Then she
makes an announcement, saying (essentially):
“My cards are among {1, 2, 9}”.
4Note that the case of two agents that hold all the cards is trivial as they know the
distribution from the beginning.
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After such announcement, the agent who holds the extra card (9) – in this
case Cath – knows the card distribution.
Step 2. That agent (Cath) makes the next announcement, which has to
inform the others of the distribution, as follows. There are three possible
ways that the cards 1, 2, 9 may be distributed among Alice and Cath: 1, 2 | 9,
2, 9 | 1 or 1, 9 | 2.
Note that Alice’s hand in this context is determined by Cath’s card within
{1, 2, 9}, so we may represent the three possibilities by Cath’s card, and these
form a set Γ =
{
1, 2, 9}. Once Alice’s cards are known, the rest of the deal
is determined by Bob’s hand. There are many hands that Bob may hold
which are consistent with Alice’s announcement: {3, 4, 5} (his actual hand),
but also, for example, {5, 6, 7}, etc. Let ∆ be the set of all such hands.
Cath will then choose a map f : Γ→ ∆ such that:
1. All cards are mentioned in the domain or range of f (else Eaves will
learn some of Alice’s cards).
2. No card belongs to all values of the mapping (else Eaves would learn
that the card is in Bob’s hand).
3. The mapping is injective (but not necessarily onto).
4. Cath’s actual card is mapped to Bob’s actual hand (so that both Alice
and Bob can learn the distribution after that announcement).
5. All other values of the mapping are chosen at random (so that Eaves
cannot learn more than intended from the protocol).
One such mapping is
f(C : 9) = B : {3, 4, 5},
f(C : 2) = B : {5, 6, 7},
f(C : 1) = B : {6, 7, 8}.
This mapping in turn gives rise to a set of possible deals; for example, if
Cath has 9 Alice has {1, 2}, and according to f , Bob should have {3, 4, 5},
so that Cath should hold the remaining cards.
Now, Cath announces that
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“The actual deal belongs to the set{
1,2|3,4,5|6,7,8,9; 1,9|5,6,7|2,3,4,8; 2,9|6,7,8|1,3,4,5}.” (1)
This announcement completes the protocol.
We claim two important properties of the protocol presented above, which
we leave the reader to check:
1. It is informative for all agents, in the sense that they all eventually
learn the card distribution.
2. It is card-safe in the sense that the eavesdropper does not learn the
ownership of any of the 9 cards.
This example gives the basic intuition behind the protocols we will work
with. Before considering a more general setting, we formally define the con-
cepts of informative and safe protocols in the next section.
3 Secure Aggregation of Distributed Infor-
mation Problems
Here we will give precise definitions needed to set up the information aggre-
gation problem. If X is a set and n a natural number, we use
(
X
n
)
to denote
the subsets of X of cardinality n. The cardinality of X is denoted #X .
3.1 Basic terminology and notation
Definition 3.1. Let Agt be a finite set of agents (or ‘players’). By a distri-
bution type we mean a vector s¯ = (sP )P∈Agt of natural numbers. We write
|s¯| for ∑P∈Agt sP .
The deck, Deck, is a finite set of cards with cardinality |s¯|. When not
mentioned explicitly we assume that Deck = {1, . . . , |s¯|}. A deal of type s¯
over Deck is a partition H = (HP )P∈Agt of Deck such that |HP | = sP for
each agent P . We say HP is the hand of P . We denote the set of all deals of
type s¯ over Deck by Deal(s¯,Deck), or merely Deal(s¯) if Deck = {1, . . . , |s¯|}.
If H is a deal, we denote by ‖H‖ its distribution type, i.e. ‖H‖P = #HP
for each agent P .
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As noted earlier, we consider that there is an initial secure dealing phase
in which a card deal is selected randomly. The process by which the cards are
distributed is treated as a black box. Afterwards, the agents have knowledge
of their own cards and of the distribution type s¯ of the deal, but know
nothing more about others’ cards. Thus, they are not able to distinguish
between different deals where they hold the same hand. We model this by
equivalence relations between deals; since from the perspective of agent P ,
a deal H is indistinguishable from deal H ′ whenever HP = H ′P , we define
H ∼P H ′ if and only if HP = H ′P . If the agents are numbered P1, . . . , Pm,
we may write ∼i instead of ∼Pi .
In [1, 11] and elsewhere, an action has been modelled as an announcement
of a set of hands that one of the agents may hold. Thus, the agent Alice
(A) would announce a subset S of (Deck
a
)
, indicating that HA ∈ S. In our
setting, however, announcing information about one’s own hand may not be
enough, as an agent may wish to share knowledge they have about the rest
of the deal. Thus, a general form of an announcement will be a set of deals
S ⊆ Deal(s¯,Deck).5 Moreover, given that there are now more agents, the
amount of actions needed to distribute the information may vary. Because
of this, we will add an additional action, end, whose sole purpose is to stop
communications once the goals have been achieved. For our information
protocols we will assume throughout that agents take turns, so that if the
agents are listed by P1, . . . , Pm, then P1 realizes an action first, followed by
P2, etc. Note that this contrasts with the example in Section 2 where Alice
goes first, followed by Cath; we may accommodate for this by allowing Bob
to “pass”. This can be modeled by making vacuous announcements, to be
made precise later (see Subsection 3.3).
In the presentation of protocols we will closely follow that in [3].
Definition 3.2 (Runs). Let Act = P(Deal(s¯,Deck)) ∪ {end}. The elements
of Act will be called actions. A (finite) run is a (possibly empty) sequence
ρ = α1, . . . , αn of actions from Act. The empty run is denoted by (). If
ρ = α1, . . . , αn and α is an action we write ρ ∗ α for α1, . . . , αn, α. An
infinite run is an infinite sequence α0, α1, α2, . . . of actions. Runs will be
assumed finite unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. We denote the length
of a run ρ by |ρ|.
5Agents may also be allowed to make announcements which are not precisely of this
form. As we will see later, such announcements can usually be simulated by announcing,
instead, the set of deals for which the announcement would be true.
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A run is terminal if its last action is end. A run is proper if it contains
no occurrences of end except possibly for the last action. We denote the set
of proper runs by Run.
For a run ρ = α1, . . . , αn, let
⋂
ρ denote the set⋂
{αi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n and αi 6= end}.
We now define the notion of protocol we will use. Below and throughout
the text, we use (x)d to mean the unique r ∈ [1, d] such that x ≡ r (mod d).
This notation will be a useful shorthand to indicate the player whose turn it
is after x steps.
Definition 3.3 (Protocol). Let Deal = Deal(s¯).
A protocol (for s¯) is a function π assigning to every deal H ∈ Deal
and every non-terminal proper run ρ ∈ Run a non-empty set of actions
π(H, ρ) ⊆ Act such that if α 6= end and α ∈ π(H, ρ) then H ∈ α and if
i = (|ρ| + 1)m (so that it is the turn of the agent Pi) and H ∼i H ′ then
π(H, ρ) = π(H ′, ρ).
An execution of a protocol π is a pair (H, ρ) of a deal H ∈ Deal and
a run ρ = α1, . . . , αn, such that αi+1 ∈ π(H, ρ[1..i]) for every i < n, where
ρ[1..i] = α1, . . . , αi.
An execution of a protocol (H, ρ) is terminating if the run ρ is terminat-
ing, i.e. if its last element is end. A protocol is terminating if it has no
infinite executions.
Thus, a protocol is a tree-like set of runs representing a non-deterministic
strategy for the communicating agents. Once a deal has been fixed, a protocol
assigns to each run a set of actions out of which the agent whose turn it is
must choose one at random. These actions are determined exclusively by
the information the agent who is to move has access to, which is assumed to
be only: (i) her hand, (ii) the distribution type s¯ of the deck Deck, (iii) the
announcements that have been made previously and (iv) the protocol being
executed. Note that protocols are generally non-deterministic and hence may
have many executions.
3.2 Some useful types of announcements
Since we will often be using announcements of a very particular type, it will
be convenient to provide a more compact notation for them.
1. An agent P may merely announce a set of hands S ⊆ (Deck
sP
)
such that
HP ∈ S. This announcement can be modeled as a set of deals, namely
{H ′ ∈ Deal(s¯) : H ′P ∈ S}.
2. Let S be a set of cards and P an agent, and suppose that P holds n cards
in S, that is, #(HP ∩ S) = n. She may then wish to announce “I hold n
cards in S.” This may also be represented as a set of deals, namely
{H ′ ∈ Deal(s¯) : #(H ′P ∩ S) = n}.
An important special case is the one where HP ⊆ S, in which case the agent
may state “All my cards are among S”.
3. The agent P may also announce a set of restricted deals. To be precise,
if B ⊆ Deck and H is any deal, let H ′ = H ↾ B denote a deal over the deck
B such that H ′P = HP ∩ B for each agent P , and let t¯ = ‖H ′‖. Then, the
agent may announce “The deal restricted to B belongs to S ⊆ Deal(t¯, B)”.
This corresponds to announcing the set of deals
{H ∈ Deal(s¯) : H ↾ B ∈ S}.
Note that for such an announcement we assume that P already knows the
distribution t¯, usually as a result of others having announced how many cards
they hold in B.
4. Agents may choose to “pass”. This may be modeled by them simply
announcing all of Deal(s¯) (as such an announcement contains no factual
information). We will denote this announcement by pass.
Note that when an agent announces “I hold n cards in S,” she does not
explicitly mention n or S since our announcements are only sets of deals. As
such announcements play a prominent role in our protocols, it will be useful
to show that other agents can essentially infer the values of n and S, which
is the meaning of the next lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let s¯ be any distribution type, α be the announcement “I hold n
cards in S” by agent P , where #S > n and sP ≥ n and sP−n < #(Deck\S),
and let β be the announcement “I hold m cards in T” with m < #T . Then,
α = β if and only if either m = n and T = S or m = sP−n and T = Deck\S.
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Proof. Clearly, α = β if m = n and T = S, or m = sP −n and T = Deck \S.
Conversely, assume that α = β. First we note that if S = T then n = m
since for any H ∈ α, #(HP ∩ S) = n, so n is uniquely determined by
#(HP ∩S). Similarly, if T = Deck \S then m = sP −n, since for any H ∈ α,
#(HP ∩ T ) = #HP −#(HP ∩ S) = sP − n.
Therefore, toward a contradiction we may assume that T 6= S and also
T 6= (Deck \ S), and consider three cases.
1. If T ( S, let x ∈ S \ T and A ⊆ S \ {x} be arbitrary with n − 1
elements. Further, let B ( Deck\S be arbitrary with sP−n elements and y ∈
Deck\(S∪B) be arbitrary (note that our inequalities guarantee that all these
conditions can be met). Consider a deal H where HP = A∪B ∪ {x} and all
other hands chosen randomly. Consider also a deal H ′ with H ′P = A∪B∪{y}
and all other hands chosen randomly as well. Clearly, #(HP ∩ S) = n so
H ∈ α, but #(H ′P ∩ S) = n − 1, so H ′ 6∈ α. Since we are assuming that
α = β, we also have H ∈ β, but since x, y 6∈ T , #(H ′P ∩T ) = #(HP ∩T ) = m
which would imply that H ′ ∈ β and thus α 6= β, a contradiction.
2. For the case where T is disjoint from S we may replace S by Deck \S and
proceed as above, noting that T ( Deck \ S.
3. Finally, we are left with the case where neither T ( S nor T is disjoint
from S. Thus there are x, y with x ∈ S ∩ T and y ∈ T \ S. Let A ⊆
S \ {x} be an arbitrary set with n− 1 elements, B ⊆ Deck \ (S ∪ {y}) have
sP − n elements, and consider two deals H,H ′, where HP = A ∪ B ∪ {x}
and H ′P = A ∪ B ∪ {y}. Then, P holds n cards from S in HP , so that
H ∈ α; but #(HP ∩ T ) = #(H ′P ∩ T ), so that H ∈ β implies that H ′ ∈ β.
However, H ′P ∩ S has n − 1 elements and thus H ′ 6∈ α, so that α 6= β, a
contradiction.
3.3 Informative and safe protocols. SADI problems
Now we will define two important properties of protocols in terms of which we
will formulate the type of problems studied in our setting. The first property
is informativity : that agents in the team learn some or all of each other’s
cards (or, the entire deal) at the end of its execution:
Definition 3.4 (Informativity). An execution (H, ρ) of a protocol π is in-
formative for an agent P if there is no execution (H ′, ρ) of π with H ′ 6= H
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but HP = H
′
P (i.e., at the end of the run the agent knows the precise card
distribution.)
A terminating protocol π is
wi: weakly informative if every terminating execution of π is informative
for some agent in Agt.
i: informative if every terminating execution of π is informative for every
agent in Agt.
Clearly, i implies wi, and in general they are not equivalent. Note that
the proof that a given protocol is informative can be assumed to be common
knowledge among the agents, and therefore the distribution of the cards at
the end of every execution becomes their common knowledge, too.
The second important property is safety : for any card c, the eavesdropper
Eaves should not know who holds it. To formulate Safety, let us first define
the eavesdropper’s ignorance set.
Definition 3.5. Given a protocol π and a run ρ, define the (eavesdropper’s)
ignorance set Ipi(ρ) as the set of all deals H such that (H, ρ) is an execution
of π.
Thus, Eaves cannot rule out any deal in Ipi(ρ) even if he has full knowledge
of the protocol and all announcements in ρ have been made. We use this
to formalize our notions of safety, which require that Eaves not be able to
determine the ownership of some or all cards or of the entire deal.
Definition 3.6 (Safety of cards). An execution (H, ρ) of a protocol π is safe
for the card c if for every agent P , if c ∈ HP there is H ′ ∈ Ipi(ρ) such that
c 6∈ H ′P . It is strongly safe for the card c if for every agent P , there is
H ′ ∈ Ipi(ρ) such that c ∈ H ′P and there is H ′′ ∈ Ipi(ρ) such that c 6∈ H ′′P .
Note that it is not enough for isolated runs to be safe, however; since
we are interested in unconditionally secure protocols, we require for every
execution of a protocol to be safe.
Definition 3.7 (Safety of protocols). A protocol π is:
ds: deal-safe if every execution of π is safe for some card c. Equivalently,
deal-safe means that the eavesdropper does not learn the deal at the end
of any execution of π.
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sP : P -safe, for an agent P , if every execution of π is safe for all cards in
HP .
s: (card-)safe if every execution of π is safe for every card c.
ss: strongly (card-)safe if every execution of π is strongly safe for every
card c.
Once again we list these conditions from weakest to strongest, so that ss
implies s, which implies sP for any player P , which in turn implies ds. With
card-safe protocols the opponent never learns any positive information about
the ownership of any card, but he may learn negative information about non-
ownership of cards. With strongly card-safe protocols the opponent learns
neither positive nor negative information about the ownership of any card.
Now, we can define the general type of problems we are interested in.
Definition 3.8 (SADI problems). A Secure Aggregation of Distributed In-
formation Problem (SADI) is a triple (s¯, ι, σ) consisting of a distribution
type s¯, an informativity condition ι ∈ {wi,i} and a safety condition σ ∈
{ds,sP ,s,ss}.
Definition 3.9 (Solvable SADI problems). A SADI problem (s¯, ι, σ) is solv-
able if there exists a terminating protocol π for s¯ that satisfies the safety
condition ι and the informativity condition σ. Every such protocol is called
a solution of the SADI problem.
In this paper we will focus on the case of safe and informative protocols,
i.e. ι = i and σ = s. Hereafter, by a SADI problem we will mean one of this
type.
4 Informative and safe protocols for the three-
agent case
In Section 2 we considered the SADI problem
(
(2, 3, 4), i, s
)
. Now, we are
going to consider the general three-agent case and to obtain a generic solution
under some simple sufficient conditions. Before describing that solution, we
need some technical preparation.
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4.1 Spreads
Let us now introduce spreads, a technical notion that generalizes the type of
announcement completing the protocol in the case of
(
(2, 3, 4), i, s
)
.
Definition 4.1 ((basic) spread). Let Y, Z be sets and
(
Z
n
)
be the set of subsets
of Z of cardinality n. A mapping f : Y → (Z
n
)
is a spread iff:
1. (Injection) f is injective;
2. (Coverage)
⋃
y∈Y f(y) = Z;
3. (Avoidance)
⋂
y∈Y f(y) = ∅.
Lemma 4.1. Let |Y | = k, |Z| = m. Then a spread f : Y → (Z
n
)
exists if
and only if the following conditions hold:
1. (Injection)
(
m
n
) ≥ k.
2. (Coverage) nk ≥ m.
3. (Avoidance) (k − 1)m ≥ nk.
Proof. The necessity of each of the first two conditions is straightforward.
For Avoidance, let Y = {y1, . . . , yk}. Then each of the elements in Z must
appear at most k − 1 times in all n-element sets f(y1), . . . , f(yk), so there
must be a total of at most m(k − 1) occurrences of elements of Z in these
sets. On the other hand, the number of these occurrences is nk, whence the
inequality.
Conversely, if all three conditions are satisfied, then a spread can be
constructed as follows. Without loss of generality we may assume that Z =
{1, 2, . . . , m}, and likewise Y = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Suppose first that 2n ≤ m,
and let q = ⌈m/n⌉. Observe that from nk ≥ m we obtain q ≤ k. Then, for
1 ≤ i ≤ q, we define
f(i) = {((i− 1)n+ j)m : 1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
It should be clear that if i 6= i′ then f(i) 6= f(i′). For i > q, choose f(i) ∈ (Z
n
)
at random in such a way that f is injective; this may be obtained in view of
the Injection condition.
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It remains to check the other two conditions, but Coverage holds trivially
by our definition of q, and Avoidance merely by using the fact that f(1) ∩
f(2) = ∅.
Now we assume that 2n > m. The construction is similar but this time
it is convenient to present it in terms of the complement of each f(i). Let
n′ = m − n and q′ = ⌈m/n′⌉. From (k − 1)m ≥ nk we obtain kn′ ≥ m and
thus q′ ≤ k. Define
f(i) = Z \ {((i− 1)n′ + j)m : 1 ≤ j ≤ n′},
and as before extend f to an injective function randomly. This time, Cov-
erage holds since f(1) ∪ f(2) = Z, whereas Avoidance holds by the way we
chose q′.
4.2 Short protocols for the three-agent case
Now we are ready to consider the general three-agent case, where Alice, Bob
and Cath hold respectively a, b, c cards, identified with the numbers 1, . . . , n
where n = a + b + c. Suppose the deal is H = A | B | C. Without loss of
generality we can assume that Alice gets the first a cards, Bob gets the next
b cards, and Cath the last c cards of the deck.
To describe the protocol, first we fix a cyclic order of making announce-
ments, e.g. first Alice, then Bob, and then Cath. When an agent gets a
turn, she may make a “real” announcement or a “dummy” one, i.e. pass.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that Alice is the first that can make a
real announcement (we will make this precise later). Now, the protocol:
Step 1. Alice chooses a card x 6∈ A and announces
“All my cards are in the set A′ = A ∪ {x}”.
Step 2. Suppose the card x is in Cath’s hand. Then Bob passes. Note that
this move tells Eaves that the extra card x is not in Bob’s hand, but Eaves
does not know what x is, so he does not know which cards of A′ are held by
Alice and therefore safety is not violated.
Step 3. Next, Cath chooses – if possible – randomly a spread
fC : A
′ →
(
B ∪ C \ {x}
b
)
such that fC(x) = B, and makes the announcement
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“For every z ∈ A′, Alice’s hand is A′ \ {z} if and only if Bob’s
hand is fP (z)”.
Step 4. Finally, Alice announces end.
Note that, in particular, Cath’s announcement above implies that Alice’s
hand is A′ \ {x} = A if and only if Bob’s hand is fC(x) = B. Thus, the
protocol is informative for each agent. Its safety follows from the definition
of spread. We leave the details of the proof to the reader.
When does a spread fC as above exist? The conditions in Lemma 4.1
translate as follows, for d = b or d = c:
1.
(
b+c−1
d
) ≥ a+ 1 (for injectivity).
Assuming b ≤ c this becomes (b+c−1
c
) ≥ a+ 1.
2. d(a + 1) ≥ b + c − 1 (for coverage). Assuming b ≤ c this becomes
ba ≥ c− 1.
3. a(b + c − 1) ≥ d(a + 1) (for exclusion). Assuming b ≤ c this becomes
a(b− 1) ≥ c, which is stronger than the inequality 2 above.
Note that the values of a, b, c above can be permuted so as to satisfy the
conditions, but once a – the number of cards of the agent who makes the
first announcement – is fixed, the conditions must hold for both cases of d.
The above described protocol works for most “balanced” distributions,
i.e. distributions where no player holds too few or too many of the cards,
which would make the conditions of Lemma 4.1 unsatisfiable. Indeed, each of
the conditions in Lemma 4.1 can be violated, so it does not cover all possible
distribution types. Here are some simple cases making condition 3 above
unsatisfiable:
• (1, b, c) for any b, c.
• (2, b, c) for any b, c, such that c > 2b− 2. E.g., (2, 2, 3), (2, 3, 5), etc.
As examples 4.1 and 6.1 and other further results show, many of these cases
are still solvable, even though not covered by Lemma 4.1.
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Example 4.1. We will show the SADI problem for distribution type (3, 3, 1)
is solvable, by informally describing the following solving protocol. It is a
variation of a solution to the two-agent Russian cards problem, which ap-
peared in [2] and, in a presentation closer to ours, in [4]. Alice ‘places’ all
cards in the points of the 7-point projective plane, also known as the Fano
plane, in such a way that her cards form a line, as indicated in Figure 1. She
then announces that her hand forms one of the lines. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can assume that the deal is 0,1,2 | 3,4,5 | 6 and that she distributes
the cards as shown in Figure 1. In this case, she announces
“My hand is one of the following:
{0,1,2}, {0,3,4}, {0,5,6}, {1,3,5}, {1,4,6}, {2,3,6}, or {2,4,5}.”
•
0
•
1
•
2
• 4
•
5
•6
•
3
Figure 1: Alice holds a line in the 7-point projective plane
One can check by inspection on the figure that Bob immediately learns the
entire deal, since there is only one line avoiding his hand. More generally,
one can easily check that this would be the case whenever Alice holds a line
and Bob holds three other cards.
Next, Bob must make a safe announcement, communicating to Alice and
Cath each other’s hands. Here we use the fact that there are seven cards
(points) and seven lines, so that there is a bijection ℓ assigning to each point
x a line ℓ(x) such that x is not on ℓ(x). Moreover, Bob can arrange it so
that ℓ(6) = 0,1,2. He then makes an announcement consisting of a sequence
of announcements of the form “If Cath holds x, then Alice holds ℓ(x).” One
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possibility is the following:{
2,4,5 | 1, 3, 6 | 0 ; 0,3,4 | 2, 5, 6 | 1 ; 0,5,6 | 1, 3, 4 | 2 ; 1,4,6 | 0, 2, 5 | 3 ;
1,3,5 | 0, 2, 6 | 4 ; 2,3,6 | 0, 1, 4 | 5 : 0,1,2 | 3, 4, 5 | 6 }.
Such announcement is possible independently of how Alice arranges the cards
on the plane. This completes the definition of a solving protocol.
An interesting problem is to precisely characterize the set of solvable 3-
agent SADI problems. We will leave this for a follow-up work. Our current
goal, instead, is to focus on extending the techniques outlined here to cases
where we have more than three agents. As it turns out, we can solve many
SADI problems with a large number of agents or cards by essentially applying
the above techniques recursively in order to reduce them to simpler SADI
problems.
5 Solvability by reduction: preliminaries and
case study
Here we will illustrate the method of reducing SADI problems to simpler ones
(with smaller sizes of distribution types) and eventually designing protocols
for solving such problems by a sequence of such reductions. First, we need
some preliminaries.
5.1 Diffusions and k-solvability
The basic ideas presented in the previous section can be generalized to a
larger number of agents, for which we need to make some notions precise.
Cath’s announcement (1) is a special case of a “diffusion”. Roughly, a dif-
fusion is a set of possible deals which, when announced, gives each of the
agents enough information to fully determine the deal, but does not let the
eavesdropper learn the ownership of any specific card.
Definition 5.1 (Diffusion). Fix a card distribution type s¯. A diffusion is a
set of deals ∆ ⊆ Deal(s¯) such that
1. if H,H ′ ∈ ∆ are such that H 6= H ′ and P is any agent then HP 6= H ′P
and
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2. for every card c ∈ Deck there are H,H ′ ∈ ∆ and an agent P such that
c ∈ HP but c 6∈ H ′P .
If #∆ = k, we say that ∆ is a k-diffusion or ∆ has size k.
For instance, Bob’s announcement in Example 4.1 is a 7-diffusion. In
what follows, it will be very important to take into account the number of
deals in a diffusion, so we introduce the notion of k-solvability. The following
definition is a modification of Definition 3.9:
Definition 5.2 (k-solvable SADI problems). Let Σ = (s¯, i, s) be a SADI
problem and let k be a natural number. Say a protocol π is a k-solution for Σ
if whenever (H, ρ) is a terminal execution of π, then Ipi(ρ) is a k-diffusion.
Σ is k-solvable if it has a k-solution.
As a “toy case”, let us begin by studying k-solvability in the two-agent
case. This case is, of course, trivially solvable (each agent knows the deal
from the beginning so the two do not need to take any actions) but, for what
will follow, we still want to know for which values of k it is k-solvable.
Lemma 5.1. For any distribution type s¯ over two agents, Alice (A) and Bob
(B), and any integer k > 1 such that k ≤ ( |s¯|
sA
)
and sA ≤ sB ≤ (k− 1)sA, the
SADI problem Σ = (s¯, i, s) is k-solvable.
Proof. Let sA = a, sB = b, d = a + b (i.e., d = |s¯|) and Deck = {1, 2, . . . d}.
In the case of two agents, both of them know the distribution from the
beginning, so no announcements are needed. Therefore all we need to show
is that under the conditions of the lemma there is a k-diffusion ∆ for the
distribution type (a, b). We construct it as follows. Recall that we use the
notation (x)d to mean the unique r ∈ [1, d] such that x ≡ r (mod d) and
let m be the least integer such that am ≥ d. By assumption, 1 < m ≤ k
because a < d and ak ≥ d. Note that a deal H is uniquely determined by HA
(since Bob holds the remaining cards), so we may define ∆ in terms of Alice’s
hands. In the first m deals in ∆, Alice holds {(1)d, . . . (a)d} in the first deal,
{(a+ 1)d, . . . (2a)d} in the second, etc., up to {((m− 1)a+ 1)d, . . . (ma)d} in
the mth. Thus, we ensure that every card in Deck appears both in a hand
of A and in a hand of B. The remaining (k − m) deals in ∆, if any, we
choose arbitrarily. The condition k ≤ (d
a
)
guarantees that there are at least
k different deals for s¯.
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5.2 A case study with multiple agents
To illustrate the notion of k-solvability we will outline a construction of a
safe and informative protocol for the SADI problem Σ with distribution type
(2, 3, 3, 3), which will involve two recursively defined reduction steps. Let
Deck = {0, 1, . . . , 9, 10} and let the set of agents be {A0,A1,A2,A3}.
In the reduction techniques that we develop further for solving SADI
problems, the original problem can be split into two or more sub-problems
solved separately, and in each of these subproblems some agents may end
up having no cards. So, for technical reasons hereafter we will consider
distribution types where some agents receive 0 cards, so they only occur
passively. Still they are considered part of the protocol and hence they, too,
hear all announcements. Hereafter we use · to denote an empty hand in a
deal in such type.
We will outline the exchange for the deal
H = A0|A1|A2|A3 = 0,1|2,3,4|5,6,7|8,9,10
as follows:
Step 1. The agent with 2 cards (here, agent A0) chooses randomly an addi-
tional card x0 and announces “All my cards are in the set A
0 = A0 ∪ {x0}”.
Step 2. Suppose without loss of generality that x0 = 2, so the agent who has
the card x0 is A1. Now, agent A1 knows the hand of agent A0 and the initial
SADI problem for the distribution type (2, 3, 3, 3), is reduced to solving the
following two simpler SADI problems:
1. Σ1, for the distribution type (2, 1, 0, 0), including the deal A0|x0| · |·.
Essentially, this is a SADI problem of type (2, 1) involving only the
agents A0 and A1. It is immediately 3-solvable, using the (only) 3-
diffusion
∆1 =
{
0, 1 | 2 | · ; 1, 2 | 0 | · ; 2, 0 | 1 | ·}
2. Σ2, for the distribution type (0, 2, 3, 3), including the deal
·|A1 \ {x0}|A2|A3.
Now, the protocol essentially calls itself recursively for the SADI problem
Σ2 with distribution type (2, 3, 3), on the deal H1 = A
′
1|A2|A3 where A′1 =
A1 \ {2}. We will trace that exchange below.
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Step 2.1. Agent A1 chooses randomly an additional card x1 from the current
deal H1 and announces “All my cards, excluding the card mentioned in A
0,
are in the set A1 = A′1 ∪ {x1}”.
Step 2.2. Suppose again w.l.o.g., that x1 = 5 and hence the agent who has
the card x1 is A2. Now agent A2 knows the hand A′1 of agent A1 in the deal
H1 (and therefore the entire deal H1). The problem Σ2 is now reduced to
solving the following two simpler SADI problems:
1. Σ21, for the distribution type (2, 1, 0), including the deal (A
′
1 | {x1} | ∅).
2. Σ22, for the distribution type (0, 2, 3), including the deal H2 = (∅ |
A2 \ {x1} | A3).
This is now a base case, as both problems are immediately 3-solvable.
The only 3-diffusion for Σ21 is
∆21 =
{
3, 4 | 5 | ·; 4, 5 | 3 | ·; 5, 3 | 4 | ·}
A randomly chosen 3-diffusion for Σ22 involving the actual deal H2 is e.g.
∆22 = {· | 6, 7 | 8, 9, 10; · | 8, 9 | 10, 6, 7; · | 8, 10 | 6, 7, 9.}
Now, in order for the only agent involved in both problems, A2, to com-
municate the deal H1 to A1 and A3, she “fuses” the 3-diffusions ∆21 and
∆22 using a multi-agent analogue of a spread from Section 4.1. Namely, A2
chooses a bijection f : ∆21 → ∆22 that associates the actual deals in ∆21 and
∆22. For example, she may define
f(3, 4 | 5 | ·) = · | 6, 7 | 8, 9, 10
f(4, 5 | 3 | ·) = · | 8, 9 | 10, 6, 7
f(5, 3 | 4 | ·) = · | 8, 10 | 6, 7, 9.
The result is the 3-diffusion
∆2 =
{
3, 4 | 5, 6, 7 | 8, 9, 10; 4, 5 | 3, 8, 9 | 6, 7, 10; 3, 5 | 4, 8, 10 | 6, 7, 9}.
We call ∆2 the fusion of ∆21 and ∆22 through f and denote it by ∆21⊕f ∆22.
We will define the operation ⊕ more formally in the next section.
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Next, agent A2 announces: “The deal H1 belongs to the set ∆2”. This
announcement completes the exchange for the SADI problem Σ2. It is clearly
informative for all agents involved in it, i.e., A1, A2, A3, because the first
deal in ∆2 is the only one consistent with their hands. It is safe, too, because
of the properties of diffusions. Indeed, every execution of the protocol for Σ2
is card-safe for every card involved in Σ2 because:
• after the announcement of A0 the eavesdropper E does not learn the
ownership of any card amongst the agents A1, A2, A3;
• the announcement of A1 leaves each deal in ∆2 possible for E ;
• for every card c of all those in the deal H1 there are two deals in the
diffusion ∆2 announced by A2 which send that card in different hands.
Thus, E does not learn the distribution of any card in H1.
Step 3. Now, likewise, A1, as the only agent involved in the problems Σ1
and Σ2, knows the entire deal H . In order to communicate it to the others,
she constructs the fusion of the 3-diffusions ∆1 and ∆2 randomly ordered
but keeping the actual deals aligned, to obtain a 3-diffusion for the original
problem Σ: ∆ = ∆1 ⊕∆2 ={
0, 1 | 2, 3, 4 | 5, 6, 7 | 8, 9, 10;
1, 2 | 0, 4, 5 | 3, 8, 9 | 6, 7, 10;
2, 0 | 1, 3, 5 | 4, 8, 10 | 6, 7, 9
}
.
Finally, agent A1 announces: “The deal H belongs to the set ∆”.
This completes the execution of the protocol for Σ2. Again, it is clearly
informative for all agents A0, A1, A2, A3, because the first deal in ∆ is the
only one consistent with their hands, and it is safe, because of the properties
of diffusions and the construction. Indeed, we only need to note that any
fusion of two k-diffusions of disjoint decks is a k-diffusion and since every
deal in each of these diffusions is possible for Eaves, so is each deal in the
fusion.
As we will see in Section 7, this is a special case of a larger class of SADI
problems which are always k-solvable. But first, let us give a more general
theory of solvability by reduction.
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6 Solvability by reduction: general theory
Here we will describe the solutions presented above in a more general light.
For this we need a few additional definitions and some notation.
Definition 6.1. Given distribution types s¯, r¯, we denote by s¯⊕r¯ the standard
vector sum, that is (s¯ ⊕ r¯)P = sP + rP for all P ∈ Agt. If S,R are disjoint
and H ∈ Deal(s¯, S), B ∈ Deal(r¯, R), we define A ⊕ B ∈ Deal(s¯⊕ r¯, S ∪ R)
by (A⊕ B)P = AP ∪BP .
Now we can give a generalization of spread:
Definition 6.2. Suppose that Dist is a distribution type and T,R are disjoint
sets of cards such that T ∪ R = Deck. Let H be the actual deal and suppose
that Γ,∆ are k-diffusions for H ↾ T , H ↾ R, respectively. Then, a spread
between Γ and ∆ is a bijection f : Γ → ∆ such that f(H ↾ T ) = H ↾ R. We
also define
Γ⊕f ∆ = {G⊕ f(G) : G ∈ Γ}.
The following is very easy to check:
Lemma 6.1. If f is a spread between k-diffusions Γ and ∆, then Γ⊕f ∆ is
a k-diffusion.
The following notion will be central for stating our main theorem.
Definition 6.3. Suppose that s¯ is a distribution type, H is a deal of type
s¯ and P an agent. Let T be a set of cards T and R = (Deck \ T ) be its
complement. We say T is splitting (for the deal H and agent P ) if, given
any deal H ′ of type s¯ such that H ′ ∼P H:
1. there exists an agent Q (possibly equal to P ) such that H ′Q ∩ T and
H ′Q ∩ R are both non-empty and
2. there exists a natural number k such that ‖H ′ ↾ T‖ and ‖H ′ ↾ R‖ are
both k-solvable.
For example, when Alice announces “I hold all cards in the set S but
one”, then S is splitting in the case of distribution type (k − 1, k, ..., k).
Indeed, the agent who holds the card in S that is not in Alice’s hand satisfies
condition 1 above. After Alice’s announcement the problem is reduced, just
like in the example in Section 5.2, to two sub-problems, respectively of types
(k − 1, 1, 0..., 0) and (0, k − 1, k, ..., k) of which the first is readily k-solvable
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and the second is of the same type as the original problem, but with one
player less holding cards. The claim that it is k-solvable, too, can be proved
by induction and is a particular case of the more general claim, stated and
proved in Theorem 7.1.
Observe that, in general, S is splitting if and only if its complement is.
The following is trivially verified:
Lemma 6.2. If T is splitting for the deal H and agent P and H ′ ∼P H,
then T is splitting for the deal H ′ and agent P .
We can now state our main reduction theorem. The strategy is to use
splitting sets in order to solve SADI problems by reducing them to simpler
problems. Informally, the general idea is as follows:
1. Agent P chooses a splitting set T . Note that T is also splitting for any
H ′ ∼P H so the choice depends only on HP .
2. Each agent announces how many cards she holds in each of T (and thus
also in R = Deck \ T ).
3. Thus, two ‘sub-problems’ of the original SADI problem are generated:
one with H ↾ T and the other with H ↾ R. The agents perform the necessary
exchanges of announcements, following the respective protocols for these sub-
problems, yielding k-diffusions Γ for H ↾ T and ∆ for H ↾ R, respectively.
4. An agent Q holding a card in both R and T then picks a random spread
f : Γ→ ∆ and announces Θ = Γ⊕f ∆.
We formalize this in the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1. Suppose that s¯ is a distribution type such that for every deal
H there is an agent P and a splitting set T for H and P . Then, Σ = (s¯, i, s)
is solvable.
Proof. We need to define a protocol π which solves Σ. Suppose that the
agents are numbered P1, . . . , Pm. We will define π by describing its set of
executions; since every initial segment of an execution is, by definition, an
execution, it in fact suffices to describe the terminal executions. These are
of the form
(H, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2 ∗Θ ∗ end),
where:
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1. The run ρ0 has length less than m where all agents pass except for P∗,
who is the first agent with the property that there is a splitting set for H
and P∗.
2. When it is the turn of P∗, she chooses such a splitting set T . Define
tP = #(HP ∩ T ) for each agent P . Then, in ρ1, each agent P (beginning
with P∗) announces “I hold exactly tP cards from T”. Note that ρ1 has length
exactly m.
3. Let R = Deck \ T . By assumption there is some k such that H ↾ T is
k-solvable, say by a protocol πT , as well as H ↾ R, say by a protocol πR.
Then, ρT is any run such that (H ↾ T, ρT ∗ end) is a terminal execution of
πT , and similarly ρR is any run such that (H ↾ R, ρR ∗ end) is a terminal
execution of πR.
4. By the definition of a splitting set there is an agent Q∗ who holds cards
both in T and in R. The run ρ2 consists of less than m actions where each
agent who is not Q∗ passes.
5. Let ∆ ⊆ Iρ(πT ) and Γ ⊆ Iρ(πR) be k-diffusions and f : Γ → ∆ be a
spread. The agent Q∗ announces Θ = ∆ ⊕f Γ. Finally, the next agent to
play announces end.
We must check that this is indeed a protocol according to our definition.
For the first m steps, let ρ0 be an execution of less than m steps of π, and
suppose that it is the turn of agent Q. Then, if there is no splitting set for
H and Q and H ∼Q H ′, then there is also no splitting set for H ′ and Q so
π(H, ρ0) = π(H
′, ρ0) = {pass}, and clearly H ∈ pass; the situation is very
similar if another agent has already made a non-trivial announcement. On
the other hand, if there is a splitting set T for H and P∗ where P∗ is the
first agent for whom this is the case, then T is also a splitting set for any
H ′ ∼P∗ H . Moreover, HP∗ ∩ T = H ′P∗ ∩ T so they have the same number of
elements, from which it follows that π(H, ρ0) = π(H
′, ρ0). Clearly H ∈ α if
α is “I hold n cards in T”, where n = #(HP∗ ∩ T ).
Now consider an execution of the form ρ0 ∗ ρ1. By Lemma 3.1, the sets
T and R = Deck \ T are uniquely determined by agent P∗’s announcement,
and as before if H ∼Q H ′ then #(HQ ∩ T ) = #(H ′Q ∩ T ), from which all
required properties follow.
If ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT is an execution of π and H ∼Q H ′, then H ↾ T ∼Q H ′ ↾ T ,
which means that
π(H, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ) = πT (H ↾ T, ρT ) = πT (H ′ ↾ T, ρT ) = π(H ′, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ),
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and similarly from the assumption that H ↾ T ∈ ⋂πT (H ↾ T, ρT ) it follows
that H ∈ ⋂ πT (H, ρT ). Executions of the form ρ0 ∗ρ1 ∗ρT ∗ρR are dealt with
in a similar fashion.
If (H, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2) is an execution of π and H ′ ∼P H is such
that (H ′, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2) is also an execution of π, then HP does not
intersect one of T or R (because, the agent Q∗ has not taken turn in this part
of the protocol yet) and hence H ′P = HP also does not intersect one of T or
R, hence π(H, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ′) = π(H ′, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ′) = {pass}.
Finally, if (H, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2 ∗Θ) is an execution of π and H ′ ∼Q∗ H
is such that (H ′, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2) is also an execution of π, then since
(H ↾ T, ρT ∗ end) is a terminal run of πT which is informative, we have
H ↾ T = H ′ ↾ T , and similarly H ↾ R = H ′ ↾ R, which means that H = H ′
and thus π(H, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2) = π(H ′, ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗ ρT ∗ ρR ∗ ρ2). Since
Θ is a k-diffusion by Lemma 6.1, it follows that this last announcement is
informative to all and the following agent may announce end.
It remains to check safety. Suppose that H is a deal, ρ = ρ0 ∗ ρ1 ∗
ρT ∗ ρR ∗ Θ ∗ end is a run such that (H, ρ) is a terminal execution of π and
H ′ ∈ Θ = Γ ⊕f ∆. Then, since Γ was a k-diffusion for πT it follows that
(H ′ ↾ T, ρT ) is an execution of πT . Similarly, (H ′ ↾ R, ρR) is a run of πR,
and hence (H ′, ρ) is also an execution of π. Since H ′ ∈ Θ was arbitrary,
Θ ⊆ Iρ(π); safety then follows from Lemma 6.1 since Θ is a k-diffusion.
Example 6.1. Recall Example 4.1 where we showed that the SADI problem
with distribution type (3, 3, 1) is solvable, using the Fano plane. Since Bob’s
announcement there is always a 7-diffusion, we have actually shown that it
is 7-solvable.
As a simple application of Theorem 6.1, we can now use splittings to
reduce other cases to this one. For instance, consider a distribution of type
(6, 7, 1) (again, not covered by Lemma 4.1).
Here is an informal description of a solving protocol. First, Alice, who
holds 6 cards, splits the deck into two subsets of 7 cards each, so that in each
of them she holds three cards. Without loss of generality, assume the deal H
is given by
0,1,2,3,4,5 | 6,7,8,9,10,11,12 | 13.
Then, for example, Alice splits the deck into S = {0,1,2,6,7,8,13} and T =
{3,4,5,9,10,11,12}. Observe that, no matter how Alice does this splitting,
Cath will hold one card in one of the sets and no cards in the other, so the
resulting distribution types of H ↾ S and H ↾ T will be (3, 3, 1) and (3, 4, 0)
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(in an unspecified order). We already know that the SADI problem for the
distribution type (3, 3, 1) is 7-solvable. Now, the one for distribution type
(3, 4, 0) is 7-solvable, too. To see this, once again arrange the seven cards
into the points of the Fano plane in such a way that Alice’s cards form a line
and let Alice announce that she holds one of the seven lines. This is already
a 7-diffusion, since Alice’s hand determines the entire deal, given that there
are only two agents holding cards here.
Thus H ↾ S and H ↾ T are both 7-solvable, so that by Theorem 6.1,
(6, 7, 1) is 7-solvable.
We will give more applications of Theorem 6.1 in the next section.
7 Some general solvability theorems
Here we will show that the splitting method provides solutions in a very
large class of cases. This will require a more in-depth algebraic-combinatorial
analysis. We will present three main results. The first two give k-solvability
for a fixed value of k. Theorem 7.1 may be used in many cases where the
total number of cards is less than mk2, although some extra assumptions are
needed, including that most players have a multiple of k cards. Theorem 7.2
shows that SADI problems are k-solvable whenever no player holds too many
or too few of the cards, provided the deck is large enough. Finally, Theorem
7.3 shows that we can drop the upper bound on the number of cards a player
may hold if we do not fix the value of k beforehand.
We begin with two combinatorial constructions which will be useful later
in this section.
Lemma 7.1. Let X be a finite set with n elements.
1. Suppose that a < n and k > 2 are such that n ≥ k2 and
(k − 1)(n− k) ≤ ka ≤ (k − 1)n.
Then, there exist sets Y1, . . . , Yk such that for all i ≤ k, #Yi = n −
a,
⋂
i≤3 Yji = ∅ whenever j1, j2, j3 are all distinct,
⋃
i≤k Yi = X and
#(Yi ∩ Yj) ≤ 2 whenever i 6= j.
2. Suppose that cn > b(b+c) for some natural numbers b > c. Then, there
are sets Y1, . . . , Yk for some number k such that #Yi = b for all i ≤ k,⋃
i≤k Yi = X and #(Yi ∩ Yj) ≤ c + 1 whenever i 6= j.
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x1 · · · xi · · · xr · · · xk
xk+1 · · · xk+i · · · xk+r · · · x2k
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
x(i−1)k+1 · · · x(i−1)k+i · · · x(i−1)k+r · · · xik
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
xqk+1 · · · xqk+i · · · xqk+r
Figure 2: Selection of the set Yi (the case when i < r).
Proof. First we prove Claim 1. The general idea is to arrange all n elements
in a rectangular table with k columns and an incomplete last row. Then for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ k we define Yi by taking all elements in the i-th column plus
sufficiently many from the i-th row to make the number of elements in Yi to
be n− a. See illustration in Figure 2.
For the technical details, write n = qk + r with 0 ≤ r < k. Note that
q ≥ k. Consider the set
I = {(i, j) : 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ q or 1 ≤ i ≤ r and j = q + 1};
it has n elements, so we may use I to enumerate X , and write X = {xij :
(i, j) ∈ I}.
Next we claim that a ≤ n − q if r = 0 and a ≤ n − (q + 1) if r 6= 0. In
the first case, we have that ka ≤ (k− 1)n = kn− n = kn− kq, so a ≤ n− q.
In the second, ka ≤ (k − 1)n = kn− kq − r and 0 < r < k so a ≤ n− q − 1.
Furthermore, from (k − 1)(n − k) ≤ ka we get kn − ka ≤ n + k2 − k,
hence n− a ≤ n
k
+ k − 1, so n− a ≤ ⌊n
k
⌋+ k − 1 = q + k − 1.
Now, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k we define Yi as follows. First, let Y ′i be the set of all
elements of X of the form xij ; observe that each Y
′
i will have either q or q+1
elements. Thus,
(n− a)−#Y ′i ≤ (n− a)− q ≤ k − 1. (2)
Given a fixed i, there are then exactly k − 1 elements of the form xji with
j 6= i. We will choose Y ′′i from among these elements in such a way that
Yi = Y
′
i ∪Y ′′i has exactly n−a elements, which is possible in virtue of (2). It
is then straightforward to check that, if i 6= j, Yi ∩ Yj ⊆ {xij , xji}, and thus
the sets Y1, . . . , Yk satisfy all desired properties.
The proof of Claim 2 uses a similar idea. Write n = qb+ r with r < b and
then write the elements of X as xij where either 1 ≤ i ≤ b and 1 ≤ j ≤ q
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or 1 ≤ i ≤ r and j = q + 1. Then, for i ≤ q let Yi be the set of all xij .
If r = 0, we are done, otherwise let Yq+1 be chosen as follows. Let Y
′
q+1
be those elements of the form xi,q+1. Then choose Y
′′ to be an arbitrary
(b− r)-element subset of the set
G = {xij : i ∈ [1, c] and j ≤ q};
it is possible to select such a Y ′′ since
cqb+ cb > cqb+ cr = cn > b(b+ c) = b2 + cb,
so that cqb > b2 and thus #G = cq > b.
Then set Yq+1 = Y
′
q+1∪Y ′′q+1. It is easy to check that the sets Y1, . . . , Yq+1
have the desired properties.
7.1 Solvability in relatively small cases
We may solve many SADI problems with a relatively small number of cards,
but we will need a few conditions on how the cards are distributed. Distri-
bution types satisfying such conditions will be called k-normal.
Definition 7.1. A distribution type is k-normal if there are at least two
agents, and there is an agent A such that
1. sA ≡ −1 (mod k)
2. if P 6= A, sP ≡ 0 (mod k)
3. if P is any agent, sP ≤ (k − 1)2.
Theorem 7.1. Given k > 2 and any k-normal distribution s¯, the SADI
problem (s¯, i,s) is k-solvable.
Proof. Note that the number of cards in any k-normal distribution s¯ equals
qk − 1 for some q ≥ 2. We proceed by induction on q. The base case, when
q = 2 follows immediately from Lemma 5.1. Suppose that the claim holds
for some q ≥ 2, for any number (at least 2) of agents and every k-normal
distribution with qk − 1 cards. Now, let s¯ has (q + 1)k − 1 cards. Consider
two cases.
1. If there are only two agents, say with s1 ≤ s2, then we have that s1 ≥ k−1
whereas s2 ≤ (k−1)2. It then follows from Lemma 5.1 that the SADI problem
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is k-solvable. Note that this argument does not depend on which of the two
agents has ‘−1 modulo k’ many cards.
2. Otherwise, Alice (the agent A from Definition 7.1) chooses at random a
set of k − 1 cards that she holds (say, A) and one that she does not (say,
b) and announces that she holds k − 1 cards from A ∪ {b}. Once again by
Lemma 5.1, the SADI problem (s¯ ↾ A ∪ {b}, i,s) is k-solvable. Meanwhile,
observe that in s¯ ↾ (Deck \ (A∪ {b})), Alice now holds a multiple of k cards,
whereas the unique agent who holds b now has −1 cards modulo k, so this
is a k-normal distribution with qk − 1 cards. It follows from the induction
hypothesis that (s¯ ↾ (Deck \ (A∪{b}), i,s) is k-solvable and, by Theorem 6.1,
so is the SADI problem (s¯, i,s), as claimed.
As an example, consider the distribution type s¯ = (5, 12, 18, 24). (For
convenience, we have listed the sizes of the hands in an increasing order.)
All agents hold a multiple of 6 cards, except for the first whose number of
cards is −1 modulo 6. Besides, (6− 1)2 = 25, and no agent holds more than
25 cards. It follows by Theorem 7.1 that s¯ is 6-solvable. More generally, we
may consider a distribution of the form (x0(k − 1), x1k, x2k . . . , xmk) with
m+ 1 agents and each xi ≤ k − 2, so that xik < (k − 1)2. By Theorem 7.1,
the SADI problem for such a distribution is always k-solvable.
7.2 Bounded solvability theorem
With larger decks, we may dispense with the assumption that most players
hold a multiple of k cards. Here we will present a general solvability result
which essentially claims that the SADI problem (s¯, i, s) is solvable for all
large enough and ‘sufficiently balanced’ distributions with both lower and
upper bounds on the size of each individual hand. The general strategy will
be to ‘unbalance’ the distribution by taking cards away from all players but
Alice, until she holds a fairly large portion of the cards so that we may apply
the following result.
Lemma 7.2. If s¯ is a distribution type such that |s¯| ≥ k2, each player has
at least three cards and
(k − 1)(|s¯| − k) ≤ ksA ≤ (k − 1)|s¯|,
then s¯ is k-solvable.
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Proof. The protocol goes as follows. First, Alice chooses sets Y1, . . . Yk as in
Lemma 7.1, such that Deck \HA = Yi for some i (the latter condition may
be enforced by choosing an appropriate permutation) and announce that her
hand is one of the Deck \ Yi. All players then know Alice’s cards because
every player holds at least three cards and therefore can distinguish between
the Yi’s, since every two of these have at most 2 cards in common.
Then, every other player announces in turn “If Alice holds Deck \Yi then
my hand is Ai”, where Ai is their true hand when Yi = Deck\HA and always
Ai ⊆ Yi. These announcements can be chosen randomly, provided they do not
contradict the previous players’ announcements. More precisely, we introduce
auxiliary sets Z1, . . . Zk which we initialise after Alice’s announcement as
Zi = Yi, for each i = 1, . . . k. Then every next player chooses for each
i = 1, . . . k a subset Ai of Zi of size equal to the number of cards in that
player’s hand and makes the announcement
If Alice holds Deck\Y1 then my hand is A1, if Alice holds Deck\Y2
then my hand is A2, . . . and if Alice holds Deck\Yn then my hand
is An.
In case when i is such that Yi = Deck \ HA, the player makes the only
possible truthful announcement by choosing Ai to be her hand. After every
such announcement, the set Zi is updated by removing the elements of Ai
from it.
An easy inductive argument shows that every player has a choice of correct
announcement for each i and that the safety of the protocol is preserved. The
latter follows from the choice of initial announcement of Alice.
Of course, we are interested in a much more general class of distribution
types, but Lemma 7.2 will be very useful since we may reduce many other
distributions to ones where a player holds most of the cards. The following
will be the more technical presentation of this idea, but later we will give
easier bounds to show its scope.
Lemma 7.3. Consider a SADI problem (s¯, i, s) with m players and suppose
that Alice holds at least |s¯|
m
cards and k ≥ 4 is such that for d = (k−1)|s¯|−ksA
k2−3k+1
we have
1. for each agent P , ksP ≤ (k − 1)|s¯|,
2. (2k − 1)(m− 1) < |s¯| − sA − d(k − 2),
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3. |s¯| − dk ≥ k2 and
4. each player holds at least k cards except possibly for one who holds
exactly k − 1 cards.
Then s¯ is k-solvable.
Proof sketch. We use complete induction on |s¯|: assuming the claim holds
for all distributions with lesser size we will show that it holds for the given
size.
Consider two cases. If for some P we have that (k−1)(|s¯|−k) ≤ ksP , then
we may use Lemma 7.2 directly. Otherwise, we choose a player P as follows.
If one player has k − 1 cards, this player is P . If not, due to item 2 and the
pigeonhole principle, there must always be a player P different from Alice
with at least 2k − 1 cards. That player announces k cards out of which she
holds k−1. Let s¯′ be the remaining distribution; note that |s¯′| = |s¯|−k. We
must check, using the induction hypothesis, that each condition still holds
for s¯′ and d′ = (k−1)|s¯
′|−ks′
A
k2−3k+1 . This boils down to fairly standard algebraic
manipulations which we have included in the appendix.
As a direct application we obtain the following solvability result; the proof
will also be left for the appendix.
Theorem 7.2 (Restricted solvability). Given m > 2 and k > 2m there exists
N such that whenever s¯ is a distribution for m players such that |s¯| > N and
for each P , k2 ≤ ksP ≤ (k − 1)|s¯|, then s¯ is k-solvable.
7.3 Unrestricted solvability theorem
We will now turn to proving a version of the previous result which implies
solvability of all large enough and ‘semi-balanced’ distributions, without pre-
scribing a value of k and without imposing upper bounds on the size of the
individual hands. We first state the result, but the proof will require several
steps.
Theorem 7.3 (Unrestricted solvability). Given m there is N such that when-
ever |s¯| > N is a distribution over at most m players and each player holds
at least 1
2
√
|s¯|/m cards then (s¯, s, i) is solvable.
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We will split the proof into two cases, each covered by a separate lemma.
The first is analogous to Theorem 7.2, except that the value of k now depends
on |s¯|. We defer the proof to the appendix.
Lemma 7.4. Given m there exists N such that whenever s¯ is a distribution
for m players such that |s¯| > N and for each P ,
1
2
√
|s¯|/m ≤ sP ≤ |s¯| − 2m
√
|s¯|,
then (s¯, s, i) is solvable.
We consider the case where one player holds a very large portion of the
deck separately.
Lemma 7.5. If s¯ is any distribution type such that each player has more
than 8m2 cards, sA ≥ |s¯|−2m
√|s¯| and |s¯| is large enough then s¯ is solvable.
Proof. Set n = |s¯| and b = |s¯|−sA ≤ 2m
√
n. We will use Lemma 7.1.2, from
which the condition cn > b(b + c) is equivalent to c > b
2
n−b , so it is sufficient
to have
c >
4m2n
n− 2m√n.
For large n, it suffices to set c = 4m
2n
n/2
= 8m2.
Then, Alice may choose sets Y1, . . . , Yk satisfying the conditions of Lemma
7.1.2 and such that Deck \ HA = Yi∗ for some i∗ (the latter condition is
obtained by permuting the cards appropriately). She then announces that
she holds one of the Deck \ Yi, after which each other player P knows the
deal since Yi ∩ Yj can have only 8m2 elements and thus HP is contained in a
single Yi. The other players then make an announcement of the form If my
cards are contained in Yi, then I hold Ai, where Ai ⊆ Yi is chosen at random
except that Ai∗ = HP . Observe that the players must make announcements
which are consistent with each other, but as we have seen before, this is easy
to accomplish provided they make their announcements one at a time.
With these results, Theorem 7.3 becomes immediate.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. We consider two cases. If sA ≤ |s¯| − 2m
√|s¯|, we
apply Lemma 7.4. If sA ≥ |s¯| − 2m
√|s¯| we apply Lemma 7.5, taking |s¯|
large enough so that 1
2
√
|s¯|/m > 8m2.
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8 Concluding remarks
We have introduced and studied a generic problem about secure exchange
and aggregation of distributed information in multi-agent systems by public
announcements, presumed intercepted by an eavesdropper. We are inter-
ested in unconditional information security, based not on encrypting that is
computationally hard to break but on the combinatorial properties of the
protocols.
We have modelled and formalised the general Secure Aggregation of Dis-
tributed Information (SADI) problem as a multi-agent generalization and
modification of the Russian cards problem. As we have seen, such a general-
ization gives rise to some issues that were not present in the original problem.
One of them is that there is more flexibility in the notions of security and
informativity that may be considered. Here we have focused on card-safe,
informative protocols, but other combinations may also be of interest.
We note that, since we consider more than two agents, the problem is
still quite non-trivial even though the eavesdropper holds no cards. Still, we
have developed some general techniques for designing safe and informative
protocols and have obtained computable solutions for a large class of SADI
problems, covering all large enough and sufficiently balanced distributions.
It should be noted that, while Theorem 6.1 works for any splitting set
T , in our main applications we only used the special case where T was of
the form A ∪ {x}, where, if P is the agent making the announcement, then
A ⊆ HP ; in other words, agents only choose one card they do not hold when
splitting. However, in future work we plan on extending the applications
using a wider class of splitting sets, such as those of Example 6.1, in order
to solve a wider class of SADI problems. Eventually, we hope to obtain a
complete classification of all SADI problems of the type considered here into
solvable or unsolvable, and to develop sufficiently strong techniques to design
solutions to all solvable cases.
Finally, we note that we have only considered card-safe SADI problems,
for which as we have shown to have the benefit that they are solvable pro-
vided they satisfy some very mild conditions. However, for many practical
applications, the more stringent notion of strongly card-safe security might
be desirable, which will be studied in future work. Eventually, we hope and
expect that our results and methods can be applied to developing practically
useful secure communication protocols; in particular, for design and secure
exchange of sensitive information, such as passwords, bank details, private
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RSA keys, etc. between distributed agents over insecure channels.
A Technical proofs
In this Appendix we include the proofs of Theorems 7.2, Lemma 7.3 and
Lemma 7.4.
Proof details for Lemma 7.3. We continue using the assumptions and nota-
tion from the proof sketch; recall that it only remained to check the case
where for all players Q, ksQ < (k − 1)(|s¯| − k). Recall also that we had
chosen an agent P such that either she holds k − 1 cards if such a player
exists, or she holds at least 2k − 1 cards. That player announces k cards
out of which she holds k − 1. Let s¯′ be the remaining distribution, so that
|s¯′| = |s¯| − k. We must check that Conditions 1–4 still hold for the new
distribution.
For Condition 1 we have that, since we had ksQ < (k− 1)(|s¯| − k) for all
Q, we now have ks¯′Q < (k− 1)(|s¯| − k) = (k− 1)|s¯′|. Condition 4 holds since
either P holds at least k cards and all other players hold at least k cards as
well except for possibly a single other player who holds k− 1. The exception
to this is when P held k− 1 cards, but in this case she holds no cards in the
new subproblem and hence does not participate in the exchange.
For Conditions 2 and 3 we must consider two subcases. It may be that
from the k cards announced by player P , Alice holds the card that P did
not hold, in which case s′A = sA − 1, or that a different player holds it and
s′A = sA. In both cases we must check that each condition still holds for s¯
′
and d′ = (k−1)|s¯
′|−ks′
A
k2−3k+1 in order to apply the induction hypothesis.
First assume that Alice holds the remaining card. Condition 2 holds since
(2k − 1)(m− 1) < |s¯| − sA − d(k − 2)
=|s¯| − sA −
(
(k − 1)|s¯| − ksA
k2 − 3k + 1
)
(k − 2)
=(|s¯′|+ k)− (s′A + 1)−
(
(k − 1)(|s¯′|+ k)− k(s′A + 1)
k2 − 3k + 1
)
(k − 2)
=|s¯′| − s′A − d′(k − 2)−
1
k2 − 3k + 1
<|s¯′| − s′A − d′(k − 2),
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and Condition 3 because
k2 ≤ |s¯| − dk = |s¯| −
(
(k − 1)|s¯| − ksA
k2 − 3k + 1
)
k
= |s¯′|+ k −
(
(k − 1)(|s¯′|+ k)− k(s′A + 1)
k2 − 3k + 1
)
k
= |s¯′| − d′k −
(
k − 1
k2 − 3k + 1
)
k < |s¯′| − d′k.
Thus Conditions 1–4 all hold and we may use our induction hypothesis to
see that s¯′ is k-solvable.
Now we consider the case where s′A = sA, and proceed with checking
Conditions 2 and 3 once again. The argument is very similar; in this case for
Condition 2 we have that
(2k − 1)(m− 1) < |s¯| − sA − d(k − 2) = |s¯′| − s′A − d′(k − 2)−
k
k2 − 3k + 1
so (2k − 1)(m − 1) < |s¯′| − s′A − d′(k − 2), whereas we obtain Condition 3
from
k2 ≤ |s¯| − dk = |s¯′|+ k −
(
(k − 1)(|s¯′|+ k)− ks′A
k2 − 3k + 1
)
k
= |s¯′| − d′k −
(
2k − 1
k2 − 3k + 1
)
k,
and thus k2 < |s¯′| − d′k. So in either case, s¯′ is k-solvable by the induction
hypothesis; since its complement is also k-solvable by Lemma 5.1 (because
Alice holds k − 1 cards and a single other player holds one), it follows that
s¯ is solvable by Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 7.2 and Lemma 7.4 are corollaries of this general result, but
before we proceed, let us establish two bounds which will be useful below.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that a, k,m, n are positive integers such that n/m ≤ a
and let d = (k−1)n−ak
k2−3k+1 . Then,
1. n(k−m−1)
m(k2−3k+1) ≤ n− a− d(k − 2) and
2. n
(
k( k
m
−2)+1
k2−3k+1
)
≤ n− dk.
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Proof. For the first claim, we see that n(k−m−1)
m(k2−3k+1) ≤ a(k−1)−nk2−3k+1 by writing
n(k−m−1)
m(k2−3k+1) =
n
m
(k−1)−n
k2−3k+1 and using the assumption that
n/m ≤ a. But plugging
in values and simplifying, we obtain a(k−1)−n
k2−3k+1 = n− a− d(k − 2).
For the second, plugging in values and simplifying we see that n− dk =
k2a−(2k−1)n
k2−3k+1 ; but once again we use the fact that
n/m ≤ a to obtain
n
(
k( k
m
− 2) + 1
k2 − 3k + 1
)
=
k2
(
n
m
)− (2k − 1)n
k2 − 3k + 1 ≤
k2a− (2k − 1)n
k2 − 3k + 1 .
Now we are ready for the final two proofs.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. We assume, as in the statement of the theorem, that
m > 2, k > 2m, s¯ is a distribution for m players and for each P , k2 ≤ ksP ≤
(k−1)|s¯|. The result will follow from Lemma 7.3 if we show that Conditions
1–4 hold when |s¯| is large. By the pigeonhole principle, the player with most
cards (which we may assume to be Alice) has at least ⌈|s¯|/m⌉ cards. Let
n = |s¯| and a = sA and recall that d = (k−1)n−akk2−3k+1 .
Condition 1. We have by assumption that ksP ≤ (k − 1)|s¯| for every player
P .
Condition 2. Since k > 2m > m+ 1 we have that k −m− 1 > 0. Moreover,
sincem > 2 it follows that k > 4, and one can easily check that k2−3k+1 > 0.
Thus (k−m−1)
m(k2−3k+1) is positive, which implies that (2k−1)(m−1) ≤ n(k−m−1)m(k2−3k+1) for
large n, since the left-hand side is fixed, whereas the right-hand side is linearly
increasing on n. We may then use Lemma A.1.1 to obtain (2k−1)(m−1) ≤
n− a− d(k − 2) for large enough n.
Condition 3. By Lemma A.1.2, n
(
k( k
m
−2)+1
k2−3k+1
)
≤ n−dk. Since by assumption
k > 2m, k
m
− 2 > 0; since, also by assumption, m > 2, we have k > 4 which
implies that k2− 3k+1 > 0. Thus for large n we obtain k2 < n
(
k( k
m
−2)+1
k2−3k+1
)
,
since once again the left-hand side is fixed but the right-hand side is increasing
on n. It follows that k2 < n− dk, as needed.
Condition 4. Each player holds at least k cards by assumption.
Thus for large enough n we may apply Lemma 7.3 and conclude that
(s¯, s, i) is solvable.
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Proof of Lemma 7.4. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 7.2. As-
sume that for each P , 1
2
√
|s¯|/m ≤ sP ≤ |s¯| − 2m
√|s¯|; once again, the player
with most cards (which we may assume to be Alice) has at least ⌈|s¯|/m⌉ cards.
Set n = |s¯|, a = sA, k =
⌈√
n
2m
⌉
and d = (k−1)n−ak
k2−3k+1 . We will show that all
conditions of Lemma 7.3 hold.
Condition 1. Multiplying the inequality sP ≤ n − 2m√n on both sides by
k =
⌈√
n
2m
⌉
we obtain
ksP ≤ k(n− 2m
√
n) ≤

k −
(√
n
2m
)
2m
√
n
n

n = (k − 1)n
for every player P by assumption and our definition of k.
Condition 2. We have that (2k − 1)(m − 1) ≤ 2
(√
n
2m
+ 1
)
m =
√
n + 2m,
whereas by Lemma A.1.1,
n− a− d(k − 2) ≥ n(k −m− 1)
m(k2 − 3k + 1) =
n
(√
n
2m
)
m
(
n
4m2
) + o(√n) = 2√n + o(√n).
Thus for large n, (2k − 1)(m− 1) < n− a− d(k − 2).
Condition 3. Observe that from k =
⌈√
n
2m
⌉
≤
√
n
2m
+ 1 we obtain k − 1 ≤
√
n
2m
and hence 4m2(k − 1)2 < n. Thus by Lemma A.1.2,
n− dk > 4m2(k − 1)2
(
k( k
m
− 2) + 1
k2 − 3k + 1
)
= 4mk2 + o(k2).
It follows that for large n, k2 < n− dk.
Condition 4. Each player holds at least k cards by assumption.
Having established Conditions 1–4, once again the result is immediate by
Lemma 7.3.
Acknowledgements
To be added later.
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